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The United States is on the cusp of a new era, with greater demand for performance information, greater data 
availability, and a greater willingness to integrate performance information into public policy. This era has 
immense promise to deliver a learning health care system that encourages collaborative improvements in systems-
based care, improves accountability, helps consumers make important choices, and improves quality at an 
acceptable cost. However, to curtail the possibility of unintended adverse consequences, it is important that we 
invest in developing sound measures, understand quality measures’ strengths and limitations, study the science of 
quality measurement, and reduce inaccurate inferences about provider performance.  
Introduction 
There is a consensus that scientifically rigorous and 
valid measurement of performance can be instrumental 
in improving value in U.S. health care.
1
 In particular 
clinical areas, such as cardiac and intensive care, 
measurement has been associated with important 
improvements in providers’ use of evidence-based 
strategies and patients’ health outcomes.2 Perhaps most 
important, measures have altered the culture of health 
care delivery for the better, with a growing acceptance 
that clinical practice can be objectively assessed and 
improved. Nevertheless, despite notable successes and 
the recent cultural change, substantial shortcomings in 
the quality of U.S. health care persist.
3
 Furthermore, the 
growth of performance measurement has been 
accompanied by increasing concerns about 
heterogeneity in the scientific rigor, transparency, and 
limitations of available measure sets, and how 
measures should be used to provide proper incentives 
to improve performance. The challenge ahead is to 
achieve the promise of measurement while avoiding the 
potential for unintended adverse consequences.  
Many conceptual and operational measurement 
challenges have become apparent in recent years. The 
limited scope of available measures, defects in 
particular measures, and invalid inferences that have 
been made based on available measures have 
compromised the potential usefulness of some 
measurement efforts for consumers, health 
professionals, and payers. Many individuals and 
organizations have also expressed concerns about the 
application of measures in payment policies that do not 
precisely discriminate differences in quality, leading to 
misclassification. Standards for measurement and their 
application for public policy are evolving, with 
controversies flaring over various technical issues. In 
an environment where both reputation and dollars 
depend on measured performance, it is often difficult to 
disentangle the legitimate concerns of those being 
measured from self-serving defenses of the status quo.  
Despite these concerns, the promotion of public 
reporting and pay-for-performance is growing, even as 
a number of studies have shown that some of the most 
prominent applications of measures in the United States 
have not met their performance improvement 
objectives.
 4
 For example, the largest U.S. test of the 
combined use of public reporting and pay-for-
performance, called the Medicare Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive Demonstration, has had little or no 
impact on the value of care received for important 
clinical conditions; the demonstration neither reduced 
patient mortality nor cost growth.
5
 Yet, based on face 
validity of the concept, expectations for success, and 
perhaps premature claims of cost savings,
6
 Congress 
mandated a Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, 
under which hospital performance is  rewarded or 
penalized with altered marginal payments.  
In this paper, we first examine the measurement 
enterprise, including which organizations develop 
measures and how payers are using measures in their 
programs, with a special focus on Medicare, which 
some contend has been in the lead on using 
measurement. Next, we summarize the mechanics of  
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performance measurement by reviewing the 
characteristics of structure, process, and outcome 
measures, and the data required to calculate these 
measures. We also review the successes and failures of 
some current applications of performance 
measurement, with an emphasis on the lack of success 
of pay-for-performance approaches and the threat to 
intrinsic motivation that such an approach represents. 
Then, we assess the problems inherent in the United 
States’ current reliance on clinical process measures, 
and explore the substantial challenges of moving to 
outcome measures.  
Based on these findings, we offer seven policy 
recommendations for achieving the potential of 
performance measurement. Specifically, we present the 
case that leaders in the public and private sectors need 
to: 
1. Decisively move from measuring processes to 
outcomes; 
2. Use quality measures strategically, adopting other 
quality improvement approaches where measures 
fall short; 
3. Measure quality at the level of the organization, 
rather than the clinician; 
4. Measure patient experience with care and patient-
reported outcomes as ends in themselves; 
5. Use measurement to promote the concept of the 
rapid-learning health care system; 
6. Invest in the “basic science” of measurement 
development and applications, including an 
emphasis on anticipating and preventing 
unintended adverse consequences; and  
7. Task a single entity with defining standards for 
measuring and reporting quality and cost data, 
similar to the role the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) serves for the reporting of 
corporate financial data, to improve the validity, 
comparability, and transparency of publicly-
reported health care quality data. 
The Quality Measurement Enterprise 
Measurement is vital to producing a health care system 
that achieves outstanding results. Without measurement 
and transparency, clinicians, institutions, patients, and 
society cannot readily evaluate the value being 
achieved in the health care system. A commonly quoted 
aphorism that encourages the measurement movement 
states, “You can’t improve what you don’t measure.”i 
The United States is about 25 years into efforts to bring 
performance measurement into medicine.
7
 A seminal 
event in this history was the decision by the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in 1992 to pivot 
from having experts review medical records to identify 
substandard practice in a small number of outlier health 
care organizations to shift to using standardized quality 
measurement aimed at understanding whether standard 
practice across the health care system could be 
improved.
8
 What was novel about this shift was the 
focus on explicit, objective criteria rather than implicit, 
subjective expert opinions, and an intention to shift the 
curve of “mean” performance toward improvement, 
rather than just focusing attention on the poor 
performance “tail” of the quality bell curve.  
After first briefly trying to rate hospitals based on 
outcomes, CMS launched an effort to characterize the 
overall performance of the nation’s hospitals, starting 
with acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) in the 
Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP). The CCP, 
which started as a pilot project in four states in the early 
1990s and then as a national project a few years later, 
was the first effort to measure performance uniformly 
across the country. It was a remarkably ambitious 
project, requiring the abstraction of more than 200,000 
medical records drawn from all the hospitals caring for 
Medicare patients. The CCP produced vital information 
that served as the foundation for what became 
remarkable improvements in cardiovascular care (see 
appendix for more on the CCP).
 9 
Following CMS’ Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, 
the Institute of Medicine released two seminal 
reports—To Err is Human and Crossing the Quality 
Chasm
10—and researcher Elizabeth McGlynn and 
colleagues published an influential article documenting 




 To which others respond, citing a quote incorrectly, but 
deliciously, attributed to Albert Einstein, “Not everything 
that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts 
can be counted.” In fact, the quote appears to be from 
William Bruce Cameron’s 1963 book, Informal Sociology: A 
Casual Introduction to Sociological Thinking. 
“In an environment where both reputation and dollars depend on measured performance, it is often 
difficult to disentangle the legitimate concerns of those being measured from self-serving defenses of 
the status quo.” 
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deficiencies in U.S. quality of care when assessed 
against specific, evidence-based metrics.
11
 With 
awareness of health care quality deficiencies rising, 
organizations began to focus more on quality: how to 
define it, how to measure it, how to collect data on it, 
and how to use those measures to improve it.  
While the popularity of performance measurement in 
health care has grown, its ubiquity is creating 
challenges for the field. Non-profit and for-profit 
organizations actively develop and promote measures 
and measurement systems that vary widely in their 
rigor and transparency. Some measures’ specifications 
are in the public domain while others’ are considered 
proprietary, with a lack of transparency about how the 
measures and performance ratings are derived. Some 
measures are publicly reported, while others are only 
used internally. Some measures can be used free of 
charge, while other measure developers require 
institutions to pay for the right to promote their 
performance results, and do not have transparent 
evaluation or an independent endorsement of their 
methods for determining performance.  
Organizations that support measurement. A number 
of organizations develop and evaluate quality measures, 
and an even larger number of organizations collect 
measures for the purpose of evaluating and reporting on 
the performance of providers. Public measure 
developers include CMS and the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ), and non-profit private 
developers include the Joint Commission and the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA); 
all use a transparent approach to give the public an 
opportunity to review and comment on their draft 
measures, refuse to use proprietary measures, and make 
transparent their measure scoring mechanisms (see 
appendix for more on these organizations). Many 
professional societies also develop measures, such as 
the American Heart Association, the American College 
of Cardiology, the Society for Thoracic Surgeons, and 
the American College of Surgeons, although methods 
may vary across the organizations. Once developed, 
quality measures may undergo evaluation by the 
National Quality Forum (NQF), a public/private, multi-
stakeholder organization that endorses general 
standards for measurement and specific measures 
themselves after a rigorous and transparent validation 
process.  
Numerous for-profit companies, including 
Healthgrades and U.S. News and World Report, have 
developed their own measures and use them to grade 
hospitals and other health care providers. However, 
most such information brokers use measures not 
endorsed by NQF, and do not always explicitly disclose 
the methods by which they rank hospitals. A number of 
researchers have questioned the validity and reliability 
of such proprietary “report cards.”12 Understandably, in 
the absence of transparent measurement standards, the 
correlation among these various report cards is low. For 
example, recently none of the 17 top hospitals listed in 
U.S. News and World Report’s “Best Hospitals Honor 
Roll” were identified as top hospitals by the Joint 
Commission in their 2010 list of hospitals that received 
at least a 95 percent composite score on a suite of key 
quality measures.
13
 Proprietary ranking systems likely 
confuse more than clarify. Findings such as this suggest 
that the measurement of quality in health care by these 
private for-profit companies is not aligned with 
measures in the public domain; it is usually impossible 
to determine if they are accurate.
14
 
In addition to measures developed primarily for public 
reporting purposes, many measures are also developed 
for use internally by a practice or facility for quality 
improvement purposes. Such measures can be 
constructed quickly by merely running a query in an 
electronic health record (EHR), or can be more 
formally specified using more rigorous methods. When 
used for internal quality improvement purposes and not 
publically reported on websites, measures need not be 
held to the same standards as those that are intended to 
be publicly reported. For example, these measures may 
have a lower specificity, meaning they result in more 
“false positive” indications of quality problems. When 
measures are only used internally to screen for quality 
issues, false positives are not a concern, since the next 
step is usually merely to investigate further; such 
investigation can determine whether, for example, a 
clinician’s suboptimal performance is a reflection on 
her actions or factors outside of the clinician’s control. 
Also, data for internal use should require less precise 
risk adjustment and allow for greater timeliness.  
While such homegrown measures might be appropriate 
for internal use, many are being reported on hospital 
websites and in marketing materials and used to make 
inferences about the magnitude of quality 
improvements they may have achieved over a period of 
time—often without sufficient information to determine 
their methodology or accuracy. For example, one 
hospital advertised that it had no infections, without 
indicating which ones or for how long. Another 
reported that its quality improvement efforts had saved 
hundreds of lives, without discussing how the 
improvements or the saved lives were measured.
15
 In 
short, the public may understandably be confused by 
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the array of measures that are now promoted in 
different places. 
Despite the broad demand for performance measures 
and the recognized limitations of current measures, the 
United States lacks an organization charged with 
advancing the science of performance measurement, 
developing standards for performance measures, setting 
parameters for how accurate the measures must be 
before they are used in pay-for-performance or public 
reporting initiatives, and coordinating the development 
of the large number of measures required to inform 
patient choice and monitor performance—so that 
different entities don’t develop duplicative yet different 
measures on the same topic. The closest thing we have 
to such an entity is NQF, which plays an important role 
by developing consensus standards for measures and 
validating measures submitted to it. However, given its 
mandate, NQF has a limited ability to support the 
development and pilot-testing of new measures itself or 
to attest to the accuracy of published measures that are 
not submitted to the NQF process.  
Measuring Structures, Processes, and 
Outcomes  
Avedis Donabedian, an influential leader in the study of 
health care quality, developed a widely used, three-
element model of quality measurement in 1966, which 
included measuring health care structures (the 
characteristics associated with a health care setting), 
processes (the activities done in a health care setting), 
and outcomes (the results achieved for a patient after a 
given set of interventions).
16
  
Structural measures include requirements imposed by 
payers and regulators, such as specifications for the 
physical plant, management systems, board 
certification, and staffing ratios.  
Process measures determine whether evidence-based 
care guidelines were followed, but do not indicate 
whether a patient’s health actually improved. Process 
measures, in essence, are used on the assumption that 
better outcomes should result from evidence-based care 
processes. Examples of process measures include the 
rate at which patients experiencing a heart attack are 
administered aspirin and beta-blockers.  
Outcome measures seek to determine whether the 
desired results are achieved. Examples of clinical 
outcome measures are whether a patient was readmitted 
to the hospital within 30 days of discharge and, for 
some conditions, whether the patient is alive at 30 days 
after admission.  
So-called “intermediate” or “surrogate” outcome 
measures are those that, while not true outcomes, are 
assumed to be able to be used as proxies for patient 
outcomes. For example, hemoglobin A1C blood test 
results are used both in research and practice as an 
indicator of whether diabetes is under control, because 
the results of the test correlate with the likelihood of 
experiencing diabetes complications. Measuring 
hemoglobin A1C on a periodic basis is a process 
measure, whereas achieving desirable hemoglobin A1C 
blood levels is sometimes labeled an intermediate 
outcome measure.  
Increasingly, quality experts also include various 
aspects of patients’ experiences as important outcome 
measures. Examples of patient experience instruments 
include the Patient Reported Outcomes Measures 
Information System, which includes modules that 
address physical health, mental health, and social 
health; HealthActCHQ, which has developed pediatric 
quality of life questionnaires, among others; and the 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (CAHPS) surveys developed under the 
auspices of AHRQ. 
Data Sources Used to Calculate Quality 
Measures 
In general, the data needed for determining 
performance with established measures are obtained 
through three sources: administrative data, medical 
records, and patient surveys.  
Administrative data are derived mostly from insurance 
claims and enrollment files. Such data are relatively 
easy and inexpensive to collect but lack the clinical 
detail needed to generate many desired measures. 
Reliance on administrative claims data therefore limits 
what and how accurately performance can be 
measured. Determining whether particular services 
were unnecessarily performed generally requires 
clinical detail to determine the appropriateness of the 
service in a particular patient’s clinical 
circumstances—information that is not available from 
claims forms. For example, without knowing the 
patient’s clinical history, current symptoms, and the 
results of images of her coronary arteries, it is 
impossible to determine whether a procedure involving 
inserting coronary artery stents into partially blocked 
arteries is appropriate. However, in some cases, the 
output from measures that use administrative claims 
have shown a high correlation with output from actual 
clinical data
17—although administrative data can vary 
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substantially in accuracy compared with medical 
records, which are also far from perfect.  
Medical record data provide substantially more detail 
about the care being provided, the patient’s history, 
condition, and complications, but are substantially less 
standardized and in many cases less practical. They are 
also more expensive to use for quality measurement 
purposes, since they require expert staff to abstract and 
interpret them to determine if a particular care process 
was conducted or not. The quality of the data may also 
be variable, particularly across different sites, practices, 
or organizations, which has implications for profiling 
and benchmarking. The widespread adoption of EHRs 
should make medical record data collection 
substantially cheaper and easier in the future, although 
it will not fill all clinical data gaps and may not address 
problems with data quality. Moreover, it can be 
difficult to extract data from paper records or EHRs, as 
there are few common standards for documentation and 
many terms vary in their meaning. As examples, site-
to-site variations in the use of terms (such as “shock”) 
or in the listing of contraindications to clinical 
strategies can lead to substantial bias in the assessment 
of performance.  
Survey data are typically collected for the purpose of 
measuring patient experience with care. In the United 
States, the CAHPS survey is the most well-known of 
these surveys, and can be fielded among samples of 
patients by mail, phone, or email. The survey was 
developed by AHRQ, has been endorsed by NQF, is 
publicly reported by many health insurance plans, and 
is widely used by a range of organizations, including 
NCQA, which requires plans to field the survey to 
obtain certain types of plan certification, and also 
certifies survey vendors that organizations can hire to 
field the CAHPS survey for them. Unfortunately, 
survey data are expensive to obtain, and their 
interpretation as a quality measure can be compromised 
due to site variation in response rates, which can bias 
results. Initially developed to assess health plan 
enrollees’ experience with their care, there are now 
CAHPS versions that focus on particular types of 
providers, including hospitals, doctor’s offices, and 
dialysis facilities, and particular topics, such as the 
extent to which a provider is using health IT tools or 
delivering care in accordance with the patient-centered 
medical home model of care.
18
 Efforts are underway to 
incorporate patient experience measures into public 
reporting of quality.
19
 For example, data collected using 
the hospital version of the CAHPS survey are now 
publicly available for all U.S. hospitals on the CMS 
website. 
To generate more robust quality measures, “hybrid” 
data collection is sometimes required, which refers to 
the combination of administrative data with 
information obtained from medical records or patient 
experience surveys. Such approaches can increase the 
number of data elements used to generate measure data, 
reduce the amount of data that must be extracted from 
medical records, or both. 
Primary Uses of Performance Measure 
Data  
In the United States, performance measure data are 
predominantly used in public reporting and provider 
incentive programs as well as provider-led quality 
improvement efforts.  
Public Reporting 
Measuring and reporting on the quality and cost of care 
serves several important functions, including: (1) 
enabling patients to make informed choices about their 
care and be more involved in medical decision-making; 
(2) allowing health care professionals to identify areas 
for improvement and providing them with the 
motivation to do so; and (3) providing consumers, 
purchasers, and taxpayers some level of accountability 
for their substantial expenditures on health care.
20
  
While ample evidence exists to demonstrate how 
publicly reporting the performance of health care 
providers can spur quality improvements,
21
 there is 
mixed evidence about how well public reporting 
informs consumer choice.
22
 Public reports seem to have 
negligible impacts on the selection of providers by 
patients and families or their representatives, primarily 
because patients are often not aware that the quality 
information is available, the information provided in 
public reports is not what they need or value, the 
information is outdated, the information is not always 
available when they need it to make a decision, or the 




Commercial health plans often publicly report provider 
performance, and sometimes also combine quality 
measurement data with price and cost information to 
attempt to categorize providers, especially hospitals, 
into different value tiers, such that plan members face 
lower cost-sharing when selecting providers in favored 
tiers.
24
 One of the most ambitious applications of 
performance measurement is in California, where the 
Integrated Healthcare Association collaborates with 
health plans and more than 200 medical groups and 
independent practice associations to maintain public 
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reporting and a pay-for-performance program using the 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS), patient experience and satisfaction survey 
data, and data documenting the adoption and use of 
health information technology by practitioners.
25
 In this 
context, performance measure data are provided to the 
public to help reassure them that quality is maintained 
even though these physicians—who are mainly paid 
capitated rates per patient by health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs)—have financial incentives that 
could result in stinting on care.  
Medicare has also been a major producer and user of 
performance measure data, initially for the purpose of 
providing information to consumers to help them select 
providers and health plans. Medicare has used its own 
administrative datasets and has made extensive use of 
patient surveys on experience of care.
ii
 The 
Medicare.gov website now provides comparative 
performance information for hospitals, nursing homes, 
home health agencies, dialysis facilities, Medicare 




Apart from promoting more informed consumer choice, 
CMS also uses performance measurement data in a 
number of its pay-for-performance initiatives, which 
provide direct financial rewards or penalties to health 
care providers based on their performance on quality 
measures. These initiatives include a suite of new 
“value-based purchasing” programs (Congress’s term 
for pay-for-performance) to reward providers who 
deliver better performance for beneficiaries at lower 
cost.
27
 Some of these programs include the End-Stage 
Renal Disease (ESRD) Bundled-Payment and Quality 
Incentive Program, performance bonuses for Medicare 
Advantage (MA) plans based on star ratings, the 
Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program, and the 
Physician Value-based Payment Modifier. 
One of the apparent success stories in the application of 
measures can be found in Medicare’s ESRD Quality 
Incentive Program; within two years of beginning this 
program, the majority of dialysis facilities showed 
significant improvement on the program’s three clinical 




 Many of the measures that use administrative claims data 
have not been validated using measures based on medical 




 Facilitating the success was the fact 
that the measures used to assess dialysis have been 
shown to be excellent intermediary outcome measures 
that reliably predict ESRD patient outcomes.
29
 
Perhaps the most prominent use of pay-for-
performance in Medicare results from the Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA) new approach to paying quality 
bonuses to MA plans colloquially referred to as the 
“Medicare 5 star program.” For several years, CMS has 
posted quality ratings of MA plans online, using a 1 to 
5 star scale, to provide beneficiaries additional 
information to inform their choice of plans. Under the 
ACA, Medicare now also pays plans differentially 
based on these star ratings and may limit enrollment in 
poorly-performing plans.  
These quality scores are based on performance 
measures derived from CMS administrative data, 
HEDIS measure data provided by plans, and survey 
data collected directly from beneficiaries using 
AHRQ’s CAHPS survey and CMS’ Health of Seniors 
survey. A recent analysis found a positive association 
between beneficiary enrollment decisions and the star 
ratings, suggesting that the performance measures are 
an important factor in making health plan choices.
30
 
Two important issues with the ratings relate to the 
limits of the measures and the regional variation 
associated with high-performing plans. First, while the 
star scale methodology culls from a reasonably broad 
set of measures, there are gaps in important areas of 
health plan performance, such as the health plan’s 
performance related to patients with acute, serious 
health care problems (which are obviously common in 
the Medicare population). For example, none of the 
measures relate to whether patients are informed about 
the advisability of referral outside of the MA plan’s 
provider network for patients with unique clinical 
circumstances, such as particular cancers best cared for 
in a specialized cancer center.  
A further problem is the skewed geographic 
distribution of performance. More than half of enrollees 
in Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, and Minnesota 
were in plans with four or five quality stars, whereas in 
19 states fewer than two percent of enrollees were in 
this top tier,
31
 implying that health plan quality 
performance mostly reflects the performance of the 
local providers who make up the health plan’s network. 
In short, while health plans generally have responded 
positively to improve their star ratings—for reputation 
and financial rewards—Medicare beneficiaries are 
likely getting only a partial picture of the value-added 
provided by any particular health plan.  
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The CMS pay-for-performance approach that is now 
receiving physician attention is the new Value-Based 
Payment Modifier, established in the ACA. The 
assignment of physician value will be used to adjust 
Medicare payments to physicians based on measured 
performance on quality and cost starting in 2015. For 
the numerator of the value-based modifier calculation, 
CMS will use the measures in its Physician Quality 
Reporting System (PQRS),
iii
 and is working on 
additional measures to assess their costs—which will 
make up the denominator in the value formula.  
The challenges with producing a composite measure of 
physician value and implementing pay-for-performance 
for individual physicians are formidable. For example, 
family physicians, general practitioners, and internists 
treat nearly 400 different diagnostic categories, with 
about 70 categories making up 80 percent of their 
clinical episodes in a year.
32
 Basing a payment modifier 
on performance on only a few PQRS quality measures 
will therefore not provide a meaningful assessment of 
the quality of a clinician’s care. Further, the core of 
what some specialties do presents substantial 
measurement challenges—for example, we currently do 
not measure whether a physician made a correct 
diagnosis. The issues of assigning a cost measure to 
physicians are similarly difficult, in this case because of 
the problems of attributing costs generated by many 
clinicians and institutional providers to a single 
physician. Using such an approach to determine a 
physician’s value, many physicians will likely be 
incorrectly assessed, with likely harmful effects on 
physicians’ reputations and the measurement enterprise 
more broadly – and patients may be misled in choosing 
physicians.  




 Initiated as a voluntary program in 2007, PQRS provides 
incentive payments to eligible physicians and other 
practitioners who report quality data. CMS provided a 1 
percent incentive payment in 2011, and will provide a 0.5 
percent incentive payment in 2012 through 2014, for 
successfully reporting at least three measures that apply to 
the services furnished by that professional from a list of more 
than 200 measures that apply to all specialties. Penalties of 
up to 1 percent will begin in 2015 for those who do not 
satisfactorily submit quality data. Fewer than 30 percent of 
practices currently submit data under the PQRS program 
(See: Iglehart and Baron, 2012). For medical groups of more 
than 200 physicians, all 26 of the current NQF-endorsed 
quality measures for coronary artery disease, diabetes, heart 
failure, and preventive care services must be reported. 
The physician value-based modifier is one of numerous 
pay-for-performance programs that Congress has 
mandated. One of the most prominent programs—
Hospital Value-based Purchasing—is being launched 
despite the fact that the demonstration that informed the 
design of that program—the Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration Project—did not actually 
produce better results than comparison hospitals, which 
also demonstrated improved scores on what were 
mostly process measures. Indeed, two evaluations 
found little evidence that the demonstration’s use of 
financial incentives to incentivize improved 
performance led to reduced mortality rates beyond 
those achieved with public reporting alone.
33
 Various 
other studies of pay-for-performance for hospitals and 
physicians have produced mixed results, at best 
showing small, sometimes temporary, improvements in 
quality. (See appendix for more details on the evidence 
base for pay-for-performance.) Further, a few studies 
have questioned the common reliance on process 
measures to improve quality for hospital and physician 
care, although it seems likely that the details—such as 
the strength of the incentives, the number and selection 
of performance measures being used, the complexity of 
the care processes being improved, and restrictions on 
how bonuses can be used—may affect the success of 
pay-for-performance programs.
34
 The message may be 
that we have not yet determined how such incentives 
can be most effectively applied, the extent to which 
they motivate hospital managers versus physicians, or 
even if they are sustainably effective in any form over 
the long run.  
Although for some, pay-for-performance is a 
commonsense approach that would surely work to 
improve performance if the incentives are large 
enough,
35
 in fact, there are both empirical and 
theoretical reasons why this approach might actually 
backfire. The approach has been used in other sectors 
of the economy without success,
36
 perhaps the most 
visible being in education where the approach is being 
subjected to increasing criticism.
37
  
Under principal-agent theory, the principal (in this case, 
the payer) offers the agent (a physician, hospital,  or 
accountable care organization) incentives to make 
maximal effort to act in the principal’s interests (i.e., to 
provide high quality to patients). But, according to one 
expert’s interpretation of the theory, if an agent is 
expected to devote time and effort to some activity that 
cannot be measured, then incentive pay cannot be used 
effectively to encourage activities that can be 
measured.
38
 Because most of what physicians do in 
caring for patients is not measured—and mostly cannot 
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feasibly be measured—rewarding a limited number of 
activities might lead to less effort—and reduced 
quality—in these other unmeasurable areas.39 However, 
so far, the limited literature that finds a lack of positive 
impact on measured quality has not found stinting on 
other important areas of quality. 
Behavioral economics offers some insights into why, 
despite intuitive appeal, pay-for-performance may have 
had a limited impact on improving quality of care. At 
root, economic incentives seek to change behavior 
through extrinsic motivation—yet most clinicians want 
the best outcomes for their patients based on an 
intrinsic motivation to act in their patient’s best 
interests. Some of the nation’s most effective quality 
improvement campaigns – such as those aimed at 
reducing central line infections and “door-to-balloon” 
times for heart attack patients requiring surgery to open 
up occluded arteries – were wholly based on intrinsic 




Further, there is evidence outside of health care that 
money may not be a solution—and in fact, it may 
backfire—particularly for cognitively challenging 
activities
41
 performed by highly skilled persons needing 
to muster their skills to manage complexity and solve 
problems creatively.
42
 While financial incentives are 
effective at changing behavior when the pathway from 
the incentive to the desired behavior is short and direct, 
the pathway from incentive to improving quality is long 
and indirect—and often times unknown. Experimental 
data demonstrate that financial incentives often crowd 
out intrinsic motivation.
43
 In particular, tangible 
rewards, especially monetary ones, undermine 
motivation for tasks that are intrinsically interesting or 
rewarding and have their strongest negative impact 
when the external rewards are perceived as large, 
controlling, contingent on very specific task 
performance, or associated with surveillance, deadlines, 
or threats. In short, if intrinsic motivation is high and 
crowding out is strong, payment incentives may worsen 
performance. 
44
 It will be important to learn whether 
organizations like hospitals respond differently to 
payment incentives than professionals.  
Issues That Arise From Reliance on 
Structure and Process Measures 
Structural measures, as described earlier, can include 
metrics such as the volume of a certain type of 
operation performed by a hospital. Such indicators can 
sometimes be a predictor of outcomes; for example, 
there is a literature that shows that for some procedures, 
institutions that do more procedures achieve better 
health outcomes,
45
 but the relationship between volume 
and outcomes is variable—by procedure and provider. 
Some quality ranking systems, like U.S. News and 
World Report’s rankings of hospitals, rely at least in 
part on structural criteria, such as nurse-to-patient bed 
ratios and availability of new technology. More 
commonly, structural criteria are included as survey 
questions to accredit or certify that a provider meets 
threshold standards to be included as a recipient of 
program funds. For example, “conditions of 
participation” establish the structural quality and safety 
standards that all U.S. hospitals must follow to 
participate in Medicare and Medicaid.  
Meanwhile, process measures—which are the most 
common type of quality measures—calculate the rate at 
which a recommended clinical or care process is 
performed. By one estimate, of 78 HEDIS measures for 
2010, all but five were clearly process measures, and 
none were true outcomes measures.
46
 Process measures 
have several theoretical advantages over outcome 
measures.  
First, calculating process measures is more 
straightforward because in some cases (for example, 
when evaluating physician prescribing) there may be 
less need for risk-adjustment to account for case mix 
differences that clearly affect outcomes. Yet, for 
process measures that evaluate patient adherence to 
treatment recommendations, for example, there may be 




Second, process measures typically reflect professional 
standards of care. As a result, they are most often 
subject to evidence-based, professional standard setting 
that is readily understood by clinicians. In contrast, the 
factors that often contribute to different outcomes 
across institutions include organizational culture, 
leadership, teamwork, technology, and other factors not 
part of professional standards of care that clinicians and 
other individuals can readily control.
48 
Thus, process 
measures are “actionable”—that is, the measure itself 
prescribes the action that the clinician, institution, or 
health plan needs to take to improve performance.
49
 
Feedback to clinicians is more personally relevant and 
thus easier to act on.  
Finally, practically, there is often a large research base 
that provides evidence on which processes reliably 
improve particular outcomes, although the studies do 
not always cover all populations of interest, especially 
the elderly.  
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Despite the theoretical advantages of process measures, 
reliance on them to assess quality presents several 
problems. 
There are major gaps in what process measures can 
measure. Currently, quality of care in the outpatient 
setting has become synonymous with preventive care 
and chronic disease management, with some growing 
interest in patient experience – virtually ignoring the 
very important quality issues of safety, effectiveness, 
coordination, and efficiency.
50
 The result is that the 
available process measures may give a very misleading 
picture of quality for clinicians and organizations.
51
 
There are important clinical areas for which measures 
are lacking and are therefore, arguably, not being given 
the attention they deserve. For example, we have few 
measures to assess:  
 diagnosis errors (which are alarmingly common 
and outnumber surgical errors as the leading cause 
of outpatient malpractice claims and settlements);
52
  
 the appropriateness of diagnostic and therapeutic 
interventions;
53
 and  
 providers’ ability to skillfully manage complex 
patients with varying combinations of multiple 
clinical and psychosocial problems.
54
  
Furthermore, many of these gaps are not likely to be 
filled, given the limited types of data currently 
available from administrative claims and clinical 
records. 
Process measures do not always predict outcomes. 
Recent research suggests that even the longstanding 
and broadly accepted CMS process measures for heart 
failure, heart attack, and pneumonia did not predict 
overall short-term mortality in the Premier 
demonstration. Similarly, currently available 
information on CMS Hospital Compare website shows 
that the process measures used to assess surgical 
performance did not help patients identify hospitals 
with better outcomes for high-risk surgery.
55
 This 




There are several possible reasons for the lack of 
relationship between process measures and short-term 
outcomes at the hospital level:  
 Process measures tend to reflect quality for narrow 
actions for a small subset of patients with particular 
conditions. For example, most of the CMS process 
measures for heart attack apply to fewer than half 
of the patients admitted to the hospital with this 




 Some process measures are only expected to 
provide a benefit over a long time horizon, so 
differences in early mortality would not be 
expected. For example, the use of beta-blockers 
after discharge for patients who survive a heart 
attack would not be expected to have a large effect 
in the subsequent 30 days, even though a benefit 
could become apparent for individual patients over 
the following year.  
 Some conveniently available process measures, 
such as smoking cessation education, were never 
associated with reduced mortality, and so would 
not be expected to reduce mortality.  
 Measurement error can weaken the association 
between a measured process and an outcome if the 
way a process is measured differs from how it was 
implemented in the original research. 
 Process measures used for some conditions, such as 
treating a heart attack, typically do not capture 
overuse or inappropriate use of medications. An 
institution could appear to be performing highly on 
a measure even if they were indiscriminately 
administering a medication to patients for whom 
the drug is contraindicated.  
 Process measures may not directly measure the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of actual care, 
even as it gives credit for performing a particular 
action. A measure might give credit for providing 
smoking cessation advice, no matter how 
perfunctory. A hospital might receive credit for 
administering a recommended medication, even if 
the wrong dose is administered, or used in a patient 
at risk for an adverse drug interaction.
58,v
  




 This means sample size could be hampering statistical 
analyses of the relationship between these process measures 
and outcomes. If compliance with the measure improves 
outcomes for a small portion of the patients, then the overall 
effect may be hard to detect. 
v
 To illustrate, one commonly used performance measure is 
whether patients receive antibiotics immediately prior to 
surgery. In evaluating an initiative at Johns Hopkins Hospital 
that used this measure, evaluators found that 30 percent of 
patients did not receive the correct dose, mainly because 
overweight patients needed a higher dose, yet the hospital 
would have received credit on the performance measure 
regardless. In this case, the lack of association that was 
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“A major concern with reliance on process 
measures rather than outcomes is that the 
hospital or medical practice being assessed 
could be diverting resources from other areas 
to ensure the requisite performance on the 
process measures, meanwhile ignoring 
problems in areas of care not being assessed.” 
Teaching to the test and diverting resources. A major 
concern with reliance on process measures rather than 
outcomes is that the hospital or medical practice being 
assessed could be diverting resources from other areas 
to ensure the requisite performance on the process 
measures, meanwhile ignoring problems in areas of 
care not being assessed, which also contribute 
importantly to hospitals’ varying outcomes.59 
Borrowing from the critique of performance measures 
in education, this is commonly referred to as “teaching 
to the test.”vi  
Practical Problems. A practical limitation in using 
process measures relates to the high cost of data 
collection; that limitation produces a heavy reliance on 
laboratory tests and prescription drugs, which limits the 
care processes than can be measured. For example, the 
key work process improvements that reduce central 
line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSI) 
relate to a checklist of recommended activities, such as 
hand washing. However, experience has shown that 
self-reported compliance grossly overestimates 
performance. To obtain a valid measure would require 
having an anonymous observer actually watch central 
line placements. However, because these catheters are 
inserted at random times throughout the day, this type 
of data collection would be exceedingly expensive. In 
this case, fortuitously a valid outcome measure (the 
CLABSI rate) was ultimately developed to substitute 
for prior reliance on unreliable and costly collection of 
process measures. Whereas an individual hospital with 
high infection rates may want to collect process 
measures on compliance with the checklist periodically 
as part of its internal quality improvement effort, 
broadly collecting these process measures for public 
dissemination would be neither valid nor feasible.  
Finally, updating process measures based on emerging 
evidence is often difficult and resource-intensive, 
resulting in the use of measures that may no longer 
meet recommended standards for process measures. In 
general, good measures should: have a strong evidence 
                                                                                                   
 
 
ultimately found between performance on this process 
measure and the outcome of interest—reducing surgical site 
infections—may have resulted from the wrong thing being 
measured.  
vi
 Most process measures also currently require manual data 
collection, which is typically performed by quality 
improvement staff, diverting their ability to participate in 
other efforts to improve care. 
base showing that the measured care process leads to 
improved outcomes; capture whether the measured care 
process has, in fact, been provided with accuracy; 
address a process that has few intervening care 
activities that must also occur to achieve the desired 
outcome; and have little or no chance of inducing 
adverse consequences by their use.
60
 Many process 
measures continue in wide use despite failing one or 
more of these criteria.  
The Challenges of Outcome Measures 
Given these reasons to avoid an overreliance on 
structure and process measures, there is growing 
interest in measuring outcomes of care.
61
 Patients are 
interested in surviving a serious illness and regaining 
optimal functioning, avoiding hospital admissions, 
having positive experiences, and minimizing 
symptoms—not the clinical processes providers use to 
achieve those desired outcomes. No set of process 
measures—even if they were accurate and important 
predictors of outcomes—can be comprehensive enough 
to serve as a substitute for actual outcomes.
62
 When 
coupled with cost data, outcome measure data can also 
present patients with a useful measure of value as they 
choose providers.  
Outcome measures are also attractive because there is 
growing recognition that hospitals can impact patient 
outcomes through factors beyond care processes—such 
as teamwork, leadership, and culture.
63
 Moreover, the 
ever growing number of process measures—some of 
which are collected by manual medical record 
extraction—place an increasing administrative burden 
on providers, often for limited return in patient 
outcomes.  
While many now call for migrating from measuring 
processes to outcomes, accomplishing the transition has 
proven devilishly difficult. Simply put, accurately 
measuring patient outcomes, while conceptually 
appealing, is very difficult to accomplish. Some of the 
key challenges associated with measuring outcomes are 
described below.  
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Risk adjustment. One reason measuring outcomes is 
challenging is because an individual patient’s outcome 
is not simply the result of the effectiveness of medical 
care, but is also impacted by a patient’s risk factors 
(i.e., how sick they are before receiving care, and how 
severe their current illness is) as well as chance 
events.
64
 Social determinants of health may also be 
important, and it is unclear to what extent providers 
should be held accountable for outcome differences 
associated with such factors. To avoid penalizing 
hospitals and physicians who treat higher-risk patients, 
measuring outcomes requires using rigorous risk 
adjustment models to account for variation in patient 
characteristics and severity of illness that may 
importantly affect outcomes.
65
 Unfortunately, while 
risk adjustment techniques have advanced in recent 
years, there is no standardized approach to adjusting 
outcomes for patient risk—different risk adjustment 
approaches make different operational decisions with 
different consequences for the measured performance 
on outcomes.
66
 In an effort to improve risk adjustment 
approaches, the Council of the Presidents of Statistical 
Societies recently produced a consensus document 
recommending that CMS augment the patient-level 
attributes it uses to risk adjust data with the addition of 
race or other demographic variables.
67
 
Risk adjustment models generally perform better when 
the patient population is narrow and well specified, 
such as patients having a specific type of surgery. Risk 
adjustment models for diverse patient populations, such 
as all hospitalized patients, perform less well and can 
often lead to inaccurate inferences.
68
 As such, measures 
of overall hospital mortality generally should be 
avoided or used cautiously,
69
 although a recently 
developed hospital-wide measure of all-condition 
readmission rates appears to perform well.
70
  
Data validity. Other challenges associated with 
measuring outcomes include concerns about the 
validity of outcome measures—meaning, whether a 
measure correctly assesses the concept being measured. 
A measure can lack validity if it inappropriately 
excludes certain information, does not appropriately 
adjust or stratify the baseline risk of measured patients, 
uses multiple and inconsistent data sources or methods, 
uses incorrect data, or does not correctly capture the 
concept of quality that it is intended to measure.
71
 
Claims data—which are often used to calculate 
performance measures, due to their low cost—can 
introduce validity concerns, since they fail to identify 
preexisting conditions and complications that occur 
after hospital admission, making an accurate 




Public reporting can also introduce validity concerns 
about the accuracy of the data being used to calculate 
performance measures. When CMS stopped paying the 
costs of selected preventable adverse events under 
diagnosis related groups, there was a marked drop off 
in reporting of now unpaid complications from central 
line infections. Yet, a study based on clinical lab data 
finds no evidence that the nonpayment policy affected 
the true infection rate.
73
 In general, measures of 
hospital infections and other complications calculated 
using administrative data correlate poorly with those 
calculated using medical record review
74
 and other 
sources. Yet, medical records are far from a gold 
standard with respect to the patient’s information. In 
short, there are considerable challenges in profiling 
institutions based on such source data. 
Surveillance bias. Another factor in measuring certain 
outcomes is surveillance bias—the idea that more 
closely monitoring something can lead to higher rates 
of detecting something of interest—which can cause 
significant errors.
75
 For example, one hospital found 
that their rate of deep venous thrombosis (DVT) 
increased ten-fold when doctors started looking harder 
for patients with this condition through greater use of 
routine ultrasounds.
76
 As a result, the hospital went 
from having one of the lowest rate of DVTs to one of 
the highest, putting the hospital at financial and 
reputational risk and demoralizing the physicians who 
felt they were providing better care though the 
enhanced surveillance. The problem of surveillance 
bias has also been observed when attempting to 
measure rates of medical errors—where more 
conscientious programs to reduce errors lead to higher 
rates of detection and apparently worse performance.  
Sample sizes. Another issue in measuring outcomes is 
that large samples are often needed to provide measures 
with acceptable random error. Many adverse outcomes 
are rare, and as such, measures of outcomes over a 
short period of time may have too few events to 
provide a stable measure. This challenge is especially 
acute in small hospitals that may have a low volume of 
specific procedures. One approach to addressing this 
problem is to consider cumulative performance over 
several years, rather than an annual measure, to 
increase the number of patients included in a measure’s 
denominator. The downside, of course, is that 
accumulating data over years will compromise the 
objective of real-time appraisal of performance and 
make it more difficult to detect changes. Personnel may 
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have changed or new care processes adopted during the 
time period of the extended performance period, 
thereby compromising the accuracy of the measure. 
Another approach would be to aggregate small 
practices into larger groups, sometimes called “pods,” 
for statistical purposes. That approach increases 
statistical sensitivity but at the cost of specificity, as the 




*  *  * 
Increasingly, the problems with process measures are 
being acknowledged. CMS has indicated that it 
recognizes it needs to strengthen its portfolio of 
hospital measures, especially outcome measures, such 
as by emphasizing measures of 30-day mortality, 
hospital-acquired infections, cost, and patients’ 
experiences with care. And while there is growing 
interest in relying on outcome measures, since they 
better reflect what patients and providers are interested 
in, establishing valid outcome measures pose their own 
substantial challenges—including the need to risk-
adjust results to account for patients’ baseline health 
status and risk factors, assure data validity, recognize 
surveillance bias, and use sufficiently large sample 
sizes to permit correct inferences about performance.  
Policy Recommendations 
It should be clear by now that measuring the quality of 
health care, while worthwhile and potentially even 
transformative, is technically difficult and prone to 
error. Given this background and the important role that 
performance measurement can play in health care, we 
make several policy recommendations to advance the 
field.  




 An approach specific to patient safety outcomes is to 
aggregate multiple types of adverse events into a global 
measure of patient safety. Yet this approach, which relies on 
“triggers” (clues in the medical record that may indicate that 
an adverse event occurred) lacks sufficient rigor to measure 
rates of outcomes and to make inferences about quality and 
may lead to biased results. See: Mattsson TO, Knudsen JL, 
Lauritsen J, et al. “Assessment of the global trigger tool to 
measure, monitor and evaluate patient safety in cancer 
patients: reliability concerns are raised.” BMJ Quality & 
Safety, doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001219, 2013. 
1. Decisively move from measuring processes to 
outcomes; 
2. Use quality measures strategically, adopting other 
quality improvement approaches where measures 
fall short; 
3. Measure quality at the level of the organization, 
rather than the clinician; 
4. Measure patient experience with care and patient-
reported outcomes as ends in themselves; 
5. Use measurement to promote the concept of the 
rapid-learning health care system; 
6. Invest in the “basic science” of measurement 
development and applications, including an 
emphasis on anticipating and preventing 
unintended adverse consequences; and  
7. Task a single entity with defining standards for 
measuring and reporting quality and cost data, 
similar to the role the SEC serves for the reporting 
of corporate financial data, to improve the validity 
and comparability of publicly-reported quality data. 
1. Decisively move from measuring processes to 
outcomes.  
The operational challenges of moving to producing 
accurate and reliable outcome measures are daunting 
but worth the commitment. Patients, payers, policy-
makers, and providers all care about the end results of 
care—not the technical approaches that providers may 
adopt to achieve desired outcomes, and may well vary 
across different organizations. Public reporting and 
rewards for outcomes rather than processes of care 
should cause provider organizations to engage in 
broader approaches to quality improvement activities, 
ideally relying on rapid-learning through root cause 
analysis and teamwork rather than taking on a few 
conveniently available process measures that are 
actionable but often explain little of the variation in 
outcomes that exemplifies U.S. health care.  
However, given the inherent limitations of 
administrative data, which are used primarily for 
payment purposes, and even clinical information in 
EHRs, consideration should be given to developing a 
national, standardized system for outcome reporting.
77
 
A new outcome reporting system would not be simple 
or inexpensive, but current data systems may simply be 
insufficient to support accurate reporting of outcomes. 
An example is the National Health Care Safety 
Network system for reporting health care infections.
78
  
Alternatively, EHR vendors could modify their 
products to allow them to be used to calculate validated 
quality measures. By standardizing which structured 
data elements they include in their products and the 
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metadata they use to describe these fields, vendors 
could allow for the calculation of validated quality 
measures, such as those collected by National Surgical 
Quality Improvement Program and the Society of 
Thoracic Surgeons. Once collected, clinical data would 
need to be evaluated for validity and quality. 
Prioritizing which measures require highly valid data 
and which do not may also help. It may be that for rare 
events, less accurate, although substantially less costly, 
administrative data would suffice, while for more 
common events and conditions, it would be more cost-
effective to collect clinical data from clinical records. 




An emphasis on measurement of outcomes, rather than 
care processes, need not ignore the contribution of 
specific processes that are associated with achieving 
better outcomes. In fact, achieving high reliability on 
process measures could be viewed as an internal tactic 
that providers might adopt as part of a comprehensive 
approach to achieve good outcomes, rather than as an 
end in itself.
80
 Professional societies or governmental 
agencies could maintain a library of process measures 
that providers could select from to audit their own 
performance. But here the distinction between 
measures for quality improvement and for public 
reporting becomes important: publicly reported 
measures could emphasize the outcomes of interest, 
while measures used internally for quality improvement 
could emphasize the care processes that an organization 
is working on performing better. 
A relatively small number of process measures, 
especially if linked with intermediate outcome 
measures, could serve as excellent measures for public 
reporting, mitigating the risks for surveillance bias, 
although the public would need to be educated about 
their clinical implications. Process measures (e.g., 
obtaining hemoglobin A1C levels in diabetics and 
properly taken blood pressure readings) could be linked 
to intermediate outcome measures (e.g., hemoglobin 
A1C level and blood pressure). The use of such 
measures in public reporting efforts could also educate 
patients and consumers about these important 
parameters of clinical care. However, caution should be 
used in using intermediary outcome measures, as 
demonstrated by the recent experience in which 
intensive treatment of patients to lower their 
hemoglobin A1C was recently shown not to be 
associated with the favorable outcomes expected. 
NCQA and others developed process measures 
favoring achievement of hemoglobin A1C levels below 
7 percent. Yet, it was precisely this level that failed to 
show improved outcomes in three recent randomized 
trials, ultimately leading to the abandonment of that 
process measure by NCQA.  
In some clinical areas, process measures that assess the 
rate at which specific harmful medical errors occur also 
hold appeal. For harms that are almost entirely 
preventable—some of which are referred to as “never 
events”—risk adjustment and other statistical concerns 
should be unimportant.  
A promising avenue for supporting a movement toward 
reliance on outcomes is greater use of patient-reported 
outcomes, which are derived using tools that measure 
what patients are able to do and how they feel through 
surveys. A wide variety of patient-level instruments to 
measure patient-reported outcomes related to physical, 
mental, and social well-being have been used in clinical 
research, such as within the National Institutes of 
Health’s Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement 
Information System. Extending this research 
application for purposes of accountability and 
performance improvement will require additional work 
to address methodological and data challenges.
81
  
2. Use quality measures strategically, adopting other 
quality improvement approaches where measures 
fall short.  
While working to develop a broad set of outcome 
measures that can be the basis for attaining the goals of 
public accountability and information for consumer 
choice, Medicare should ensure that the use of 
performance measures supports quality improvement 
efforts to address important deficiencies in how care is 
provided, not only to Medicare beneficiaries but to all 
Americans.  
CMS’ current focus on reducing preventable 
rehospitalizations within 30 days of discharge 
represents a timely, strategic use of performance 
measurement to address an evident problem where 
there are demonstrated approaches to achieve 
successful improvement.
82
 Physicians and hospital 
clinical staff, if not necessarily hospital financial 
officers, generally have responded quite positively to 
the challenge of reducing preventable readmissions. 
CMS has complemented the statutory mandate to 
provide financial incentives to hospitals to reduce 
readmission rates by developing new service codes in 
the Medicare physician fee schedule that provide 
payment to community physicians to support their 
enhanced role in assuring better patient transitions out 
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CMS recently announced that after hovering between 
18.5 percent and 19.5 percent for the past five years, 
the 30-day all-cause readmission rate for Medicare 
beneficiaries dropped to 17.8 percent in the final 
quarter of 2012,
84
 implying some early success with 
efforts to use performance measures as part of a broad 
quality improvement approach to improve a discrete 
and important quality and cost problem. However, this 
approach is not without controversy. Improvements 
have been modest, and some suggest that readmission 
rates are often outside the hospital’s control, so CMS’ 
new policy unfairly penalizes hospitals that treat 
patients who are the sickest.
85
 And while readmission 
in surgical patients is largely related to preventable 
complications, readmissions in medical patients can be 
related to socioeconomic status. Also, some have even 
questioned the accuracy of CMS’seemingly 
straightforward readmission rate measure, finding that 
some hospitals reduce both admissions and 
readmissions—a desirable result—yet do not impact 
the readmission rate calculation.
86
 And one of this 
paper’s authors (R. Berenson) has suggested a very 
different payment model that would reward hospital 
improvement rather than absolute performance, thereby 
addressing the reality that hospitals’ abilities to 




We consider the current controversy around 
implementation of a readmissions penalty to be a 
healthy debate. Because the purpose for which the 
penalty was designed is so important, scrutiny and 
vigorous discussion can lead to improvements to CMS’ 
payment policy and performance measures to address 
what remains an unacceptable failure in U.S. health 
care delivery. There clearly is a tension between getting 
the measures absolutely right and achieving a “good 
enough” status that can produce quality improvement. 
In the words of Jonathan Blum, deputy administrator 
and director for the Center of Medicare at CMS, “It’s a 
very traumatic event to go back to the hospital. I’m 
personally comfortable with some imprecision to our 
measures.”88  
With the growing evidence that Congress’s value-based 
purchasing approach to measuring and rewarding 
hospitals only marginally improves patient outcomes, 
and possibly diverts attention from doing the hard work 
of making culture and work process improvements that 
actually would produce improved outcomes, Congress 
should refocus its directives to CMS to emphasize 
improving specific quality deficiencies—relying more 
on promoting collaborative quality improvement 
activities and new payment approaches that incorporate 
performance measures than on public reporting and 
pay-for-performance per se. As an illustration, the 
nuclear industry has a robust approach to improving 
quality using peer-to-peer review, validated tools, and a 
focus on learning rather than judging.
89
 
CMS on its own created the Partnership for Patients, a 
public/private partnership to improve the quality, 
safety, and affordability of health care for all 
Americans. The initiative promotes active collaboration 
by physicians, nurses, and other hospital personnel, as 
well as employers, patients and their advocates, and the 
federal and state governments to address tangible 
problems where approaches to quality improvement to 
improve outcomes exist but need broad-based adoption. 
Specifically, CMS is funding 26 hospital engagement 
networks to allow 3,700 hospitals to share best 
practices, and funding 82 sites to provide care 
transitions services to Medicare beneficiaries leaving 
the hospital through the agency’s Community-Based 
Care Transitions Program; it is also encouraging patient 
engagement through both of these efforts.
 90
 The 
Partnership for Patients began in 2011, under the 
guidance of then acting CMS Administrator, Donald 
Berwick, and has targeted two basic areas for quality 




1. Making Care Safer. By the end of 2013, 
preventable hospital-acquired conditions would 
decrease by 40 percent compared to 2010. 
2. Improving Care Transitions. By the end of 2013, 
preventable complications during transition from 
one care setting to another would be decreased so 
that all hospital readmissions would be reduced by 
20 percent compared to 2010. 
Unfortunately, this effort started without validated 
performance measures and currently lacks valid 
performance measures for most of the conditions. As a 
result, it will be exceedingly difficult to evaluate 
whether this program improved quality or safety for 
patients. Given the significant public investment in this 
program, rigorous evaluation should be a requirement. 
A successful model of the strategic use of measures to 
accomplish substantial quality improvement can be 
found in the recent effort to reduce CLABSI (see 
appendix for more information on CLABSI). In this 
case, the primary motivation for physicians, nurses, and 
other hospital staff to participate in this activity was 
intrinsic—to reduce preventable mortality and 
morbidity caused by infections. One of the authors (P. 
Pronovost) who was instrumental in developing and 
leading the CLABSI-reduction programs believes that 
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“CMS’ current value-based purchasing efforts, 
requiring reporting on a raft of measures of 
varying usefulness and validity, should be 
replaced with the kind of strategic approach 
used in the national effort to reduce 
bloodstream infections.” 
public reporting of infection rates by states, Consumer 
Reports, the Commonwealth Fund, and, later, CMS had 
a generally positive effect on stimulating interest and 
action at senior levels of hospital management. Also 
contributing were the efforts of the Joint Commission 
with its national patient safety goals, and the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National 
Healthcare Safety Network and its work with state 
health departments to shine a spotlight on a problem 
that had a solution. The CDC recently reported that 
central-line bloodstream infections dropped by 41 
percent between 2008 and 2011.
92
  
Many opportunities for broad-based collaborations to 
improve hospital quality exist. CMS’ current value-
based purchasing efforts, requiring reporting on a raft 
of measures of varying usefulness and validity, should 
be replaced with the kind of strategic approach used in 
the national effort to reduce bloodstream infections.  
Similarly, the current approach to improving the quality 
of care provided by physicians in Medicare needs to be 
reconsidered. Many physicians believe quality 
reporting on a few measures is being promoted as an 
end in itself, whether or not the particular measures 
chosen represent high priority for improvement, can 
accurately reflect the physician’s actual quality of care, 
or are associated with meaningful patient outcomes. 
Drawing inferences about a physician’s quality using a 
few measures peripheral to the physician’s core 
professional activities may well be misleading and a 
diversion from the opportunity to engage physicians in 
substantive quality improvement activities.  
Here, again, policymakers should be more strategic, 
focusing on clinical areas where measures are 
meaningful and valid, and where concerted multi-party 
collaboration could materially improve the health of the 
population. With this approach, it is likely that not all 
physicians in Medicare would be routinely measured; 
but much of what the public wants to know about 
physician competence and performance cannot be 
measured using the currently available measure sets. 
Strategies that work through peer assessment and 
fostering professionalism may also provide promising 
opportunities to improve quality and safety. 
Observing the lack of “high leverage” processes of 
surgical care, particularly those specific to particular 
procedures, experts on surgical quality have suggested 
that surgeons be encouraged and supported to 
participate in surgical learning collaborative activities, 
with no reporting or rewards for individual 
performance.
93
 Building on this suggestion, a more 
strategic approach would judge the effectiveness of 
care in terms of collective improvements in 
outcomes—on clinical quality, patient experience, and 
cost. Measurement would be integrated into quality 
improvement initiatives, such as those led by Regional 
Health Improvement Collaboratives,
94
 national medical 
specialty societies,
95
 national specialty boards,
96
 and 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) as they come 
online. In short, Congress should allow CMS greater 
flexibility to provide physician incentives to actively 
participate in meaningful quality improvement 
collaboratives as an alternative or a complement to 
routine reporting and public reporting on a handful of 
quality measures. 
3. Measure quality at the level of the organization, 
rather than the clinician. 
Historically, the physician has been viewed as the 
leader of medicine, with responsibility for the care and 
outcomes of patients; in iconic photographs and 
paintings, the physician is seen as a lone, heroic figure. 
Such a view has led to natural interest in the 
measurement of individual physicians’ performance. It 
is therefore not surprising that some of the information 
brokers, including the U.S. News and World Report and 
many city magazines like the Washingtonian provide 
ratings of “top doctors,” often based mostly on 
reputation, warranted or not.  
However, this focus on the individual is flawed for 
most measures of quality and presents substantial 
technical challenges. Systems-based care is emerging 
as a key value within health care and a vital component 
of high quality care, while the notion that an individual 
health professional can be held accountable for the 
outcomes of patients in isolation from other health 
professionals and their work environment is becoming 
an outdated perspective. For example, better intensive 
care unit staffing sometimes mitigates the evidence that 
surgeons who perform more procedures achieve better 
outcomes.
97
 The communication and coordination of 
services across providers is required to ensure that 
patients, many of whom have multiple conditions, are 
assisted through various health care settings.
98
 For 
some aspects of care, such as diagnosis errors and 
patient experience, measuring at the individual 
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physician level might be considered. Nevertheless, 
focusing measurement on an individual runs counter to 
our goals in promoting teamwork and “systemness” as 
core health care delivery attributes.  
For some professionals whose individual performance 
does matter, such as a surgeon in the operating room, 
there are rarely meaningful and valid process measures 
that reflect their individual performance anyway. In 
contrast, surgical outcomes depend crucially on the 
performance of the entire surgical team and the facility 
in which the procedure takes place. Also, consistent 
with the discussion of intrinsic motivation earlier, it is 
plausible that individuals respond differently to 
payment incentives than do organizations; assessment 
and pay-for-performance at the organizational instead 
of the individual level should be less likely to crowd 
out health professionals’ intrinsic motivations to 
provide high-quality care. 
In addition to the conceptual issues with measuring an 
individual clinician’s performance, technical and 
statistical issues are also prominent. The attribution of a 
particular care process or outcome to a particular 
clinician is often difficult, if not impossible, to make. 
For example, several specialists, hospitalists, nurses, 
technicians, and others will typically care for a patient 
with a heart attack. Good estimates of performance 
require that the individual or group being evaluated 
have a sufficient number of observations to make 
inferences about their performance that are precise 
enough to be meaningful. Yet, many physicians and 
other health care professionals often lack sufficient 
volumes of certain types of patients to permit valid 
inferences about their performance. By focusing 
assessment on the organization, hospital unit, or clinic, 
rather than the individual clinician, measures can assess 
and promote team-based care while addressing many of 
the technical issues that can undermine the value of 
measurements. For virtually every performance 
measure evaluated (e.g., safety culture, patient 
experience, hand hygiene, infection rates, process 
measures) there is usually substantially greater 
variation among units within a hospital than among 
hospitals. The unit or clinic is therefore often the most 
effective focus for improvement. 
While measuring at this level is conceptually right and 
technically easier than measuring a single individual’s 
performance, it nevertheless presents challenges. For 
example, it makes strategic sense to measure the quality 
of ACOs, especially to guard against the possibility that 
ACOs would stint on care as they receive increasing 
incentives to limit spending. Yet, recently, 31 Pioneer 
ACOs participating in a major CMS demonstration sent 
CMS a letter criticizing both the agency’s use of 
measures that “are not yet mature” and the way in 
which CMS determined the thresholds for acceptable 
performance.
99
 We expect they will work through the 
differences and arrive at a reasonable result.  
Finally, measuring at the level of the organization does 
not imply that substandard individual performance 
should be tolerated. CMS and its contractors should 
aggressively use performance measures to identify such 
unacceptable performance and sanction or otherwise 
limit the ability of these practitioners to serve Medicare 
beneficiaries. But the role of measurement for 
“policing” the performance of individuals is different 
from public reporting to inform patient choice or to 
provide financial incentives to improve performance.  
4. Measure patient experience with care and 
patient-reported outcomes as ends in themselves. 
Performance measurement has too often been plagued 
by inordinate focus on technical aspects of clinical 
care—ordering a particular test or prescribing from a 
class of medication—such that the patient’s perspective 
of the care received may be totally ignored. Moreover, 
many patients, even with successful treatment, too 
often feel disrespected. Patients care not only about the 
outcomes of care but also and their personal experience 
with care. There is marked heterogeneity in the patient 
experience, and the quality of attention to patients’ 
needs and values can influence their course, whether or 
not short-term clinical outcomes are affected. Some 
patients have rapid recovery of function and strength, 
and minimal or no symptoms. Other patients may be 
markedly impaired, living with decreased function, 
substantial pain, and other symptoms, and with 
markedly diminished quality of life. It would be remiss 
to assume that these two groups of patients have similar 
outcomes just because they have avoided adverse 
clinical outcomes such as death or readmission.  
In recommending a focus on measuring outcomes 
rather than care processes, we consider surveys or other 
approaches to obtaining the perspectives of patients on 
the care they receive to be an essential component of 
such outcomes. When designed and administered 
appropriately, patient experience surveys provide 
robust measures of quality, and can capture patient 
evaluation of care-focused communication with nurses 
and physicians.
100
 And while patient-reported measures 
appear to be correlated with better outcomes, we 
believe they are worth collecting and working to 
improve in their own right, whether or not better 
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We believe that measuring patient experience is not 
only important because it can facilitate care that 
improves clinical outcomes, but also because it 
represents an important outcome in its own right. If our 
health system is truly to commit itself to the goal of 
delivering patient-centered care, it requires assessment 
of patients’ experiences with the care they receive and 
self-reported health status and functioning—whether or 
not they are associated with commonly-measured 
outcomes such as mortality, complications, errors, and 
avoidable readmissions. With the growing array of 
scientifically rigorous surveys of patient experiences 
with care,
102 
we now have the capacity to incorporate 
standardized assessments of that experience into the 
measurement enterprise, increasing our sensitivity to 
the detection of differences in the results that are being 
achieved by provider organizations, assuming that we 
can adequately take into account baseline differences in 
patient characteristics. Given the inevitable gaps in 
both process and outcome measures for specific areas 
of clinical care, it is important to realize that patient 
experience is ubiquitous and can be drawn upon to 
measure a broad range of performance.  
5. Use measurement to promote the concept of the 
rapid-learning health care system.
 
 
Initiatives to promote performance measurement need 
to be accompanied by support to improve care. Quality 
measure data should not only be technically correct, but 
should be organized such that their dissemination is a 
resource to aid in quality improvement activities. As 
such, quality measurement should be viewed as just one 
component of a learning health care system that also 
includes advancing the science of quality improvement, 
building providers’ capacity to improve care, 
transparently reporting performance, and creating 
formal accountability systems.  
There are several strategies to make quality measure 
data more actionable for quality improvement purposes. 
For example, for publicly reported outcome measures, 
CMS provides hospitals with lists of the patients who 
are included in the calculation. Since the outcomes may 
occur outside the hospital for mortality and for 
readmissions that are at other hospitals, this 
information is often beyond what the hospitals already 
have available to them. These data give providers the 
ability to investigate care provided to individual 
patients, which in turn can support a variety of quality 
improvement efforts.  
In addition, collaborative activities among institutions 
can produce insights that may elude them individually. 
Measures can help identify top performers, and detailed 
analysis can identify what distinguishes those who 
excel. As an example, the marked improvement 
nationwide in the “door-to-balloon” time it takes 
patients experiencing symptoms of a heart attack to 
receive a treatment to open up occluded coronary 
arteries was largely a result of relevant and valid 
measurement of provider-specific timeliness, followed 
by intense investigation of the features of top 
performance, and only then a national campaign to 
transform practice using the best practices uncovered 
by the top performers – all facilitated by the intrinsic 
motivation of health professionals on the front lines to 
improve patient outcomes. 
To facilitate a learning health care system, investments 
are also needed to advance quality improvement 
sciences and to build capacity among provider 
organizations to practice these sciences. For example, 
although root causes analysis is a promising tool, its 
full potential has not been realized in health care; a 
likely explanation, at least in part, is that health care is 
one of the only risky industries in which lawyers and 
practitioners, rather than safety experts with formal 
training, investigate adverse events. Promising efforts 
to improve quality and safety are based on adherence to 
professional norms and include peer-to-peer review, a 
technique borrowed from the nuclear industry.
103
 In 
addition, EHR vendors and other medical device 
manufacturers will need to agree to share their data and 
open it for analysis.  
6. Invest in the basic science of measurement 
development and applications, including an 
emphasis on anticipating and preventing 
unintended adverse consequences.  
In describing the problems with process measures and 
the challenges with outcome measures above, the 
unfortunate reality is that there is no body of expertise 
with responsibility for addressing the science of 
performance measurement. NQF comes closest, and 
while it addresses some scientific issues when deciding 
whether to endorse a proposed measure, NQF is not 
mandated to explore broader issues to advance the 
science of measure development, nor does it have the 
financial support or structure to do so. An infrastructure 
is needed to gain national consensus on: what to 
measure, how to define the measures, how to collect the 
data and survey for events, what is the accuracy of 
EHRs as a source of performance, the cost-
effectiveness of various measures, how to reduce the 
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costs of data collection, how to define thresholds for 
measures regarding their accuracy, and how to 
prioritize the measures collected (informed by the 
relative value of the information collected and the costs 
of data collection).  
Despite this broad research agenda, there is little 
research funding to advance the basic science of 
performance measurement. Given the anticipated broad 
use of measures throughout the health system, funding 
can be a public/private partnership modeled after the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute or a 
federally-funded initiative, perhaps centered at AHRQ. 
Given budgetary constraints, finding the funding to 
support the science of measurement will be a challenge. 
Yet, the costs of misapplication of measures and 
incorrect judgments about performance are substantial.  
Moreover, the science of performance measurement 
and improvement needs an academic home. While 
many medical and health policy societies and 
associations have sections on quality or quality 
measurement, no professional society primarily focuses 
on the science of quality measurement and 
improvement. Such an entity could set standards for 
and advance the science of quality measurement, 
thereby moving the policy discussion from whether 
measures are good enough to use despite their flaws to 
a more fundamental discussion of how to achieve good 
measures, how to assess whether current measures 
measure up, and whether the costs of attaining good 
measures are worth the benefits. Professional societies, 
such as the American Heart Association, have an 
important role in speaking authoritatively about the 
science of clinical issues; performance measurement 
lacks a similar authoritative voice.  
Such an endeavor needs to explicitly consider the 
unintended, yet harmful, consequences of 
misapplication of performance measures, whether 
resulting from the measures themselves, in how they 
are reported and assessed, or in the costs of collecting 
invalid performance data. There is substantial literature 
detailing such untoward consequences,
104
 some from 
measures experts who promote the use of performance 
measurement. For example, some have expressed 
concern that unless carefully designed, public reporting 




7. Task a single entity with defining standards for 
measuring and reporting quality and cost data, 
similar to the role the SEC serves for the reporting 
of corporate financial data, to improve the validity, 
comparability, and transparency of publicly-
reported health care quality data. 
There is a plethora of health care quality data being 
pushed out to the public, yet no rules to assure the 
accuracy of what is being presented publicly. The 
health care industry lacks standards for how valid a 
quality measure should be before it is used in public 
reporting or pay-for-performance initiatives, although 
some standards have been proposed. The NQF does a 
good job of reviewing and approving proposed 
measures presented to it, but lacks the authority to 
establish definitive quantitative standards that would 
apply broadly to purveyors of performance measures. 
Yet, as discussed earlier, many information brokers 
publically report provider performance without 
transparency and without meeting basic validity 
standards. Indeed, even CMS, which helps support 
NQF financially, has adopted measures for the PQRS 
that have not undergone NQF review and approval. 
Congress now is considering “SGR repeal,” or 
sustainable growth rate legislation, that would have 
CMS work directly with specialty societies to develop 
measures and measurement standards, presumably 
without requiring NQF review and approval.
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Without industry standards, payers, policy makers, and 
providers often become embroiled in a tug-of-war; with 
payers and policy-makers asserting that existing 
measures are good enough, and providers arguing they 
are not. Most often, neither side has data on how good 
the contested measures actually are. Most importantly, 
the public lacks valid information about quality, 
especially outcomes, and costs. 
Indeed, most quality measurement efforts struggle to 
find measures that are scientifically sound yet feasible 
to implement with the limited resources available. 
Unfortunately, too often feasibility trumps sound 
science. In the absence of valid measures, bias in 
estimating the quality of care provided will likely 
increase in proportion to the risks and rewards 
associated with performance. The result is that the 
focus of health care organizations may change from 
improving care to “looking good” to attract business. 
Further, conscientious efforts to reduce measurement 
burden have significantly compromised the validity of 
many quality measures, making some nearly 
meaningless, or even misleading. Unfortunately, 
measurement bias often remains invisible because of 
limited reporting of data collection methods that 
produce the published results. In short, the 
measurement of quality in health care is neither 
standardized nor consistently accurate and reliable.  
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In short, while the number of performance measures is 
growing, the health care field lacks an entity to create 
the rules for reporting quality and cost data; as a result, 
the great variation in performance measure 
specifications is slowing efforts to advance quality—at 
times creating conflict over opposing findings. 
The field of quality measurement could advance 
significantly if providers and policy-makers agreed on 
validity thresholds and transparently reported the 
validity of their quality measure data. Before the SEC 
was created in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 
1929, when looking at companies’ financial data, the 
information provided by one business could not be 
compared to another; there were no standard rules for 
reporting performance. Congress established the SEC 
as an independent, nonpartisan government entity to, 
among other things, help ensure standards in the 
disclosure of financial information, make financial 
performance transparent, audit businesses, ensure 
compliance with rules, and apply penalties for 
transgressions.   
Policymakers will need to consider whether such an 
entity should be housed at AHRQ; should be a public-
private partnership, such as NQF; or should be a 
separate, new government entity. Such a commission 
could promote standardization, transparency, and 
auditing of the reporting of quality and cost measures. 
Consistent with First Amendment guarantees of free 
speech, we would not provide such an entity regulatory 
authority to require adherence to standards. Rather, we 
would anticipate that organizations would voluntarily 
seek to comply with the applicable standards for 
reporting performance measures. Under the model, this 
entity would set the rules for the development of 
measures and the transparent reporting of performance 
on these measures, analyze progress (with input from 
clinicians, patients, employers, and insurers), and audit 
publicly-reported quality measure data. Private sector 
information brokers could then conduct secondary 
analyses of the reports, much like happens in the 
financial industry through companies like Bloomberg. 
This SEC-like model would thus ensure that all 
publicly-reported quality measure data are generated 
from a common basis in fact and allow apples-to-apples 
comparisons across provider organizations. 
Conclusion 
The interest in promoting a health care system that 
rewards performance needs to be balanced with the 
practical challenges faced when measuring 
performance. Improvement requires substantial 
investments in the underlying science of measurement, 
greater care in communicating measurement results, 
greater attention to the role of measures in quality 
improvement efforts, and using performance data in 
more strategic ways. The adoption of flawed 
measurement approaches that do not accurately 
discriminate between providers can undermine 
professional and public support for provider 
accountability, reward indiscriminately, and divert 
attention from more appropriate and productive quality 
improvement efforts.  
  
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 20 
 
The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
or the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.  
About the Authors and Acknowledgments  
Robert A. Berenson, MD is an institute fellow at the Urban Institute. Peter J. Pronovost, MD, PhD is the director of 
the Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality at Johns Hopkins, as well as Johns Hopkins Medicine’s 
senior vice president for patient safety and quality. Harlan M. Krumholz, MD, is the director of the Yale-New 
Haven Hospital Center for Outcomes Research and Evaluation, director of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Clinical Scholars program at Yale University, and the Harold H. Hines, Jr. professor of cardiology, investigative 
medicine, and public health. The authors thank Lawrence Casalino, MD, PhD, chief of the Division of Outcomes 
and Effectiveness Research and an associate professor at Weill Cornell Medical College, and Andrea Ducas, MPH 
and Anne Weiss, MPP of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for their helpful comments on this paper. This 
research was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 
About the Urban Institute  
The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the 
social, economic, and governance problems facing the nation.  
About the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation  
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation focuses on the pressing health and health care issues facing our country. As 
the nation’s largest philanthropy devoted exclusively to health and health care, the Foundation works with a diverse 
group of organizations and individuals to identify solutions and achieve comprehensive, measurable, and timely 
change. For 40 years the Foundation has brought experience, commitment, and a rigorous, balanced approach to the 
problems that affect the health and health care of those it serves. When it comes to helping Americans lead 
healthier lives and get the care they need, the Foundation expects to make a difference in your lifetime. For more 
information, visit www.rwjf.org. Follow the Foundation on Twitter www.rwjf.org/twitter or Facebook 
www.rwjf.org/facebook.  
  
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 21 
 
Appendix 
The Role of Performance Measurement in Improving Cardiovascular Care 
Twenty years ago, many patients with heart disease were not being treated in accordance with available evidence-
based best practices. For example, among patients discharged from the hospital after an acute myocardial 
infarction, only about half were treated with beta-blocker drugs and only about two-thirds with aspirin.
1,2
 Many 
other evidence-based treatments were similarly underused,
3
 and treatment of patients presenting to the hospital with 
an acute myocardial infarction was often delayed.
4
 There was also troubling regional variation, with some areas of 
the country performing markedly worse than the national average on the measures being used, which was already 
low. 
The past two decades have seen a remarkable transformation in cardiovascular care. In the past decade alone, 
hospitalizations for acute myocardial infarction have dropped by more than 25 percent and hospitalizations for heart 
failure have fallen by more than 30 percent.
5,6
 Mortality after hospitalizations for acute myocardial infarction has 
also decreased by more than 20 percent.
7
 These improvements have occurred in an era without the introduction of 
new blockbuster drugs, but with a strong emphasis on performance measurement and quality improvement. 
The key change began with the decision by CMS to support the explicit measurement of care provided to patients 
with an acute myocardial infarction. First with the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project pilot, launched in the early 
1990s, and then with the national Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, which followed a few years later, the agency 
exposed gaps in the quality of care and supported efforts to improve. This performance measurement provided 
objective information about the quality of care being delivered.
8
 
Of note, this broad-based change in practice occurred without financial incentives. Instead, the motivation derived 
from intrinsic motivation related to professionalism (clinicians’ desires to provide the best care they could and to 
safeguard their reputations). Supportive organizations, including the American College of Cardiology, the 
American Heart Association, Medicare’s Quality Improvement Organizations, consortia of hospitals, and others 
merely encouraged health care professionals to embrace the responsibility to improve care.  
A prime example of measurement stimulating improvement through these programs is the experience with delays in 
treatment, which is measured as “door-to-balloon” time—the period from when the patient arrives at the hospital 
with symptoms of an acute myocardial infarction to the time that blood flow in a blocked artery is restored with an 
emergency percutaneous coronary intervention. The longer the delay, the more damage is done and the more likely 
the patient is to die. Measurement of door-to-balloon time, later required by CMS, revealed that less than a third of 
patients were being treated within the guideline-recommended time of 90 minutes.
9
 National measurement, through 
an industry-sponsored registry, enabled the identification of exemplary hospitals that were treating patients faster 
than the vast majority. With funding from the National Institutes of Health, research then identified the strategies 
employed by the top performers.
10
 A national campaign to disseminate those strategies ensued, resulting today in 
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Go back to the paper 
Key Players in the Quality Measurement Enterprise 
Key entities involved in quality measurement include the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), the 
National Quality Forum (NQF), The Joint Commission, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). 
NCQA is a private, nonprofit institution that has been reviewing and accrediting health insurance plans since 1991. 
More recently, NCQA developed accreditation and certification programs for a range of health care entities, 
including groups of provider organizations that want to become accountable care organizations and practices that 
want to be patient-centered medical homes. In 1992, NCQA took responsibility for maintaining a set of newly-
developed quality measures called HEDIS, which had been developed by a group of employers and HMOs the year 
before. In 1995, NCQA used these measures to release the first-ever report card on health plan performance. Today, 
HEDIS measures are used by a range of organizations to measure performance at both the plan and provider level, 
and are largely focused on outpatient care. The full HEDIS set includes 80 quality measures divided into five 
domains of care and is updated every year. NCQA follows a standardized process for developing its measures, 
which includes multiple stages of internal and external review by a range of advisory groups. NCQA uses three 
overarching criteria to determine the desirability of adding a new measure: relevance, scientific soundness, and 
feasibility. Operationally, numerous other criteria help define these major criteria.
1
 NCQA is governed by an 
independent 15-member board of directors, and receives support through grants and corporate sponsorships
2
 and 
through revenues from certification fees it charges plans and providers. 
NQF is a private, nonprofit membership-based organization that builds consensus around quality improvement 
priorities and goals, evaluates and endorses quality standards and measures submitted to it by a variety of types of 
organizations, and conducts education and outreach activities around quality improvement and performance 
measurement. NQF's membership includes consumer organizations, public and private purchasers, physicians, 
nurses, hospitals, accrediting and certifying bodies, supporting industries, and healthcare research and quality 
improvement organizations. NQF’s primary role in the quality landscape is evaluating measures that other 
organizations develop; Many HEDIS measures, for example, are endorsed by NQF. To date, the organization has 
endorsed nearly 700 measures, all of which are publicly accessible in their database. NQF evaluates all submitted 
standards according to four major criteria: importance, scientific acceptability, feasibility, and usability (although if 
the standard does not meet the first two criteria, it is not considered against the other criteria). Despite the fact that 
NQF assesses measures against these criteria, it does not establish specific standards that payers and information 
brokers must adhere to when publicly reporting measures or applying payment incentives to providers in pay-for-
performance programs using NQF-endorsed measures. NQF does not endorse proprietary measures, for which the 
specifications or performance are not in the public domain. NQF is governed by a 33-member board, and receives 
funding from both public and private sources, including grants from foundations, corporations, and contracts from 
the federal government, particularly the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS’s) Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
The Joint Commission, formerly the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), is 
an independent, not-for-profit organization that accredits more than 20,000 health care organizations and programs 
in the United States. This volume stems in part from the fact that states and CMS require hospitals and other health 
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care organizations to be accredited by the Joint Commission in order to be eligible to participate in Medicaid and 
Medicare. The Joint Commission provides accreditation and certification services for hospitals, home health care 
organizations, nursing homes, behavioral health care organizations, ambulatory care providers, and independent or 
freestanding clinical laboratories. It develops performance standards that address elements of operation, such as 
patient care, medication safety, infection control, and consumer rights. In 1997, the Joint Commission introduced 
the ORYX initiative, which includes outcomes and other performance measurement data into the accreditation 
process. In 2010, it categorized its performance measures into accountability and non-accountability measures, 
placing more emphasis on an organization’s performance on accountability measures, which focus on research, 
proximity, accuracy, and adverse events. The organization is governed by a 32-member Board of Commissioners 
that includes physicians, administrators, nurses, employers, a labor representative, quality experts, a consumer 
advocate and educators. It receives support through accreditation fees, as well as corporate sponsorships.
3
  
AHRQ is a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. AHRQ’s mission is to improve 
the quality, safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of health care nationwide.
4
 AHRQ’s Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) program is a multi-year initiative to support and promote the 
assessment of consumers’ experiences with health care. Through the CAHPS program, AHRQ has developed 
standardized patient experience surveys that are widely used by health plans, doctor’s offices, and dialysis 
facilities,
5
 and maintains a benchmarking database containing the results of various organizations’ administrations 
of this survey.
6
 The various versions of the CAHPS surveys ask patients and their caregivers to report on and 
evaluate their experiences with health care. These surveys focus on elements of care that consumers deem most 
important, as well aspects of quality that consumers are best qualified to assess, such as the communication skills of 
providers and ease of access to health care services.
7
 AHRQ also maintains a clearinghouse of a variety of types of 
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Does Pay-for-Performance Work? 
As required by statute, pay-for-performance programs are being launched by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) even though quality of care on the CMS core measure set is already improving substantially 
without additional financial incentives.
1
 Since October 2012, under the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program, 
1 percent of hospital payments are adjusted based on performance on specific process, patient experience, and 
outcome measures—rising to 2 percent in October 2017. Extra payments are provided to hospitals for both 
achievement and improvement in performance. To promote hospital activity to perform even better, some have 
called for a much greater percentage at risk based on performance to increase the financial stakes.
2
  
Yet, the demonstration that informed the design of the hospital VBP program—the Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration Project (HQID)—did not actually produce better results than other hospitals, which have 
also demonstrated improved scores on what were mostly process measures. Indeed, two evaluations found little 
evidence that the demonstration’s use of financial incentives to incentivize improved performance led to reduced 
  
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 24 
 
mortality rates beyond those achieved with public reporting alone.
3,4
 Another hospital pay-for-performance 
program implemented in Medicaid in Massachusetts, with much larger financial incentives than in the Premier 
demonstration, also showed that pay-for-performance had no effect on health outcomes.
5 
 
In contrast, a pilot in the northwest region of England, built on the Premier demo approach, found that mortality for 
conditions in the pay-for-performance program—pneumonia, heart failure, and heart attack—decreased, although 
statistically significant only for pneumonia. There was a small increase in mortality for the larger number of 
conditions not being rewarded, although the increase did not achieve statistical significance.
6
 Of note, participating 
hospitals adopted a range of quality improvement strategies in response to the performance incentives, to attempt to 
accomplish systemic change. Also, this incentive program offered larger bonuses and a greater likelihood of 
achieving bonuses than the U.S. HQID prototype—leading some to speculate that stronger incentives using more 
measures might achieve a better result from pay-for-performance.
7 
Meanwhile, the findings on pay-for-performance for physicians are mixed. In 2004, the United Kingdom 
introduced a major pay-for-performance approach—the Quality Outcomes Framework—with 136 measures for 
general practitioners. Payments were generous, adding up to 25 percent more to general practitioners’ (GPs’) 
income; more than 99 percent of eligible physicians participated.
8
 Analysis showed that the approach did accelerate 
improvement on measured performance for asthma and diabetes, but not coronary heart disease in the short term; in 
addition, once targets were reached, improvement in the quality slowed, while the quality of care for two conditions 
not linked to incentives actually declined, as did scores on measures assessing continuity of care.
9
 Further analyses 
were mixed. One showed improvement in process performance among GPs led to outcome improvements for 
diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, epilepsy, and hypertension, whereas another found that reported 
improvements in blood pressure control did not reduce stroke, heart attack, or all-cause mortality as would be 
expected. 
In the United States, a major pay-for-performance effort has been carried out by the Integrated Healthcare 
Association (IHA), an organization with broad representation by health plans, medical groups, purchasers, and 
consumers. In contrast to the UK approach, IHA has been providing small bonuses for almost a decade to medical 
groups based on performance on individual measures in the areas of clinical quality, patient experience, and health 
information technology use. Studies
10,11
 have also shown mixed results, with one concluding that medical groups 
responses to the pay-for-performance incentives “did not translate into the breakthrough improvement in quality 
desired by plans and purchasers.”12  
Overall, studies do not provide much support for reliance on process measures to improve quality for hospital and 
physician care, although it seems likely that the details—such as the strength of the incentives, the number and 
selection of performance measures being used, and restrictions on how bonuses can be used—may affect the 
success of pay-for-performance programs.
13
 The message may be that we have not yet determined how such 
incentives can be most effectively applied, the program theory for how they work, the extent to which they 
motivate hospital managers versus physicians, or even if they are sustainably effective in any form over the long 
run.  
___________________________ 
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Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infections 
Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) killed nearly 31,000 inpatients in the United States in 
2002.
1
 In response to growing awareness of this problem, health providers, hospitals, and payers have mounted 
various activities which together have produced major reductions in mortality rates among intensive care unit 
(ICU) patients, although not among other inpatients.
2
 The major success can be attributed to collaborations among 
ICU clinicians to adopt evidence-based practices known to prevent such infections. A pilot project in one ICU at 
Johns Hopkins
3
 was expanded to the statewide Keystone collaborative in Michigan and reduced CLABSIs by 66 
percent in 103 ICUs.
4,5
 Hospital mortality in Michigan decreased significantly once the collaborative was 
implemented,
6
 with an estimated cost savings of $1.1 million per year.
7
 Recent estimates by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention attribute a 58 percent reduction in ICU-related CLABSIs between 2001 and 2009 to large 
scale programs, such as the Keystone project, and the spread of the culture and CLABSI interventions to every 
state. Over 1,100 hospitals participated in this unique AHRQ-funded collaborative effort among Johns Hopkins 
physicians, the Michigan Hospital Association, the American Hospital Association, and many state affiliates and 
individual hospitals. Participating hospitals reduced CLABSI rates by 40 percent, achieving a mean infection rate 
of 1.1 per 1000 catheter days, a rate previously believed to be unattainable.   
___________________________ 
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